Separability and public finance

Stephane Gauthier and Guy Laroque

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In a second best environment, the optimal policy choice sometimes follows first best rules, as described in a number of scattered works. This paper presents a formal general argument which allows to unify much of the literature. It lays down the information structure and separability assumptions under which the results hold in a variety of setups, with extensions to preference heterogeneity and individual production sets

Keywords: separability; second best optimality; indirect taxes; Samuelson rule; Pigovian taxation; individual production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00731132v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2009, 93 (11-12), pp.1168-1174. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.09.003⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00731132v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Separability and public finance (2009)
Working Paper: Separability and Public Finance (2008)
Working Paper: Separability and public finance (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00731132

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.09.003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().