How lotteries outperform auctions

Olivier Bos

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Abstract: In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among participants with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Charity; Complete information; Lotteries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Economics Letters, 2011, 110 (3), pp.262-264. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.025⟩

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Journal Article: How lotteries outperform auctions (2011)
Working Paper: How lotteries outperform auctions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01079501

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.025

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