A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley and Issofa Moyouwou
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]
Issofa Moyouwou: MASS - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I

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Abstract: Analytical representations are developed for the probability that Approval Voting (AV) elects the Condorcet Loser in three-alternative elections with large electorates. A comparison of AV is then made to Plurality Rule (PR) to show that AV is much less susceptible to the risk of electing the Condorcet loser than PR. All calculations in this analysis are based on IAC-like assumptions.

Keywords: Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 80, pp.115--122. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009⟩

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Journal Article: A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452548

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009

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