Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?

Georges Casamatta (), Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau
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Georges Casamatta: LISA - Laboratoire « Lieux, Identités, eSpaces, Activités » (UMR CNRS 6240 LISA) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Università di Corsica Pasquale Paoli [Université de Corse Pascal Paoli]

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Abstract: In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers.

Keywords: SOCIAL SECURITY; IMPLICIT TAXATION; PENSIONS; RETIREMENT AGE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Economics of Governance, 2006, 7 (2), pp.143-154. ⟨10.1007/s10101-005-0001-9⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity? (2006)
Working Paper: Is there a political support for the double burden on prolonged activity? (2006)
Working Paper: Is There a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity? (2004)
Working Paper: Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02520599

DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0001-9

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