The Timing of (Green) Incentives: Exploiting Opportunity Windows

Gilles Grolleau (), Naoufel Mzoughi and Emilien Prost ()
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Gilles Grolleau: ESSCA - ESSCA – École supérieure des sciences commerciales d'Angers = ESSCA Business School
Emilien Prost: ESSCA - ESSCA – École supérieure des sciences commerciales d'Angers = ESSCA Business School

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Abstract: Incentives have been extensively studied in the management and policy literature, with most attention focusing on their type, magnitude, alignment, and effects. More recently, scholars paid attention to discounting issues and how these issues impact the effectiveness of incentives. Building on the nascent literature related to incentive timing, we argue that timing can offer an additional dimension to better characterize incentives and leverage their power by exploiting windows of opportunity. Using conceptual reasoning, we identify several mechanisms by which the timing of incentives can be used to increase their behavioral power. Specifically, well-timed (green) incentives can harness temporal landmarks, intermittence, immediacy and surprise effects, and intrinsic motivation reinforcement to reach environmental goals without significantly increasing the overall costs. We also indicate new avenues for further research such as designing a timing menu or considering time itself as an incentive.

Keywords: environmental policies; incentives; opportunity window; temporal landmarks; timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-ene
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Published in International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2024, 18 (4), pp.491-521. ⟨10.1561/101.00000170⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04389954

DOI: 10.1561/101.00000170

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