A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

Noemí Navarro and Andres Perea

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Abstract: Abstract We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link, (i,j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that this procedure yields the Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if the marginal value of any link in a connected component is increasing in the number of links in that connected component.

Date: 2013-01-01
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Published in The BE Journal of Theoretica Economics (Advances), 2013, 13 (1), pp.131-150. ⟨10.1515/bejte-2012-0006⟩

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Journal Article: A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value (2013)
Working Paper: A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05113100

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2012-0006

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