Network Externalities, Coordination Failures and Non Standardization

Externalités de réseau, défaut de coordination et diversité des standards

Hubert Stahn
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Hubert Stahn: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, I show that several standards may survive in markets characterized by network externalities. This result is not explained by strategic choices in an dynamic context. It simply follows from a failure of coordination. In fact, I consider a two stage game. The firms first choose their standard. Afterwards, they choose their production levels in markets in which network externalities occur. Subgame perfect equilibria characterized by non-standardization exist but are socially inefficient.

Keywords: Equilibre parfait par les sous-jeux; Diversité; Défaut de coordination; Choix du standard; Externalités de réseau (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2002, 65, pp.195-218. ⟨10.2307/20076321⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05221040

DOI: 10.2307/20076321

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