Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

Marie Laclau () and Tristan Tomala

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a perfect equilibrium, as players become increasingly patient. There are two conditions: admissibility and joint rationality. An admissibly feasible payoff can be achieved by an action profile that offers no unilateral deviation which is both undetectable and profitable. It is jointly rational if for all weights on players, the weighted average payoff is greater than or equal to the minmax level of the weighted average payoff function. This characterization is alternative to the one provided by the "score method" of Fudenberg and Levine (1994). We provide a simple construction of equilibrium strategies based on cooperation, punishments and rewards. Punishments rely on Blackwell's approachability algorithm.

Keywords: Repeated games; Public monitoring; Pure strategies; Approachability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 169, pp.400-424. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring (2017)
Working Paper: Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01503768

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().