 Le prix des services juridiques entre défaillance de la réglementation et défaillance de marché ?Post-Print from HAL Abstract: The structural reforms undertaken in the field the law profession are underpinned by an industrial organization based logic. The former regulatory framework wasn't, according to this view, exclusively grounded on a public interest logic, but it was captured by the professional themselves in order to be protected against any competitive threat. Such a phenomenon induces excessive prices. This contribution aims at highlighting this debate and at assessing the possibility to implement a competition based governance model in this field, by taking into account the specificities of the services in terms of quality and induced external effects. Keywords: regulated professions; legal services; regulatory capture; excessive prices; economics of conventions; professions réglementées; activités juridiques; capture de la réglementation; prix excessifs; économie des conventions (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2018, Les marchés du droit, XXXI (4), pp.61-82 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01797969 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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