Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool
Louis Lévy-Garboua,
Claude Montmarquette,
Jonathan Vaksmann () and
Marie Claire Villeval
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Jonathan Vaksmann: GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Abstract:
We study mutual-aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution-based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no-insurance equilibrium while contribution-based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a \dual interior equilibrium". That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co-existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.
Keywords: mutual-aid; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01476440v1
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Citations:
Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2017, 19 (1), pp.198-218. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12181⟩
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool (2017) 
Working Paper: Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool (2017) 
Working Paper: Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool (2017) 
Working Paper: Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool (2015) 
Working Paper: Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool (2015) 
Working Paper: Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01476440
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12181
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