Impermanent types and permanent reputations

Mehmet Ekmekci (), Olivier Gossner and Andrea Wilson
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Olivier Gossner: PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science
Andrea Wilson: Department of economics - NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System

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Abstract: We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model with a long-run player and a series of short-run players. We provide explicit lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player, both ex-ante and following any positive probability history. Under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero, both bounds converge to the Stackelberg payoff if the type space is sufficiently rich. These limiting conditions hold in particular if the game is played very frequently.

Keywords: Reputation; Repeated games; Impermanent types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 147 (1), pp.162-178. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.006⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Impermanent types and permanent reputations (2012)
Working Paper: Impermanent types and permanent reputations (2012)
Working Paper: Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754608

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.006

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