Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

Daniel Laskar

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn.

Keywords: Global game; Ambiguity; Coordination; Equilibrium selection; Financial crises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economics Letters, 2014, 122 (2), pp.317-320. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018⟩

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Journal Article: Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game (2014)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00924130

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018

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