Lobbying for Globalisation

Michael Blanga-Gubbay, Paola Conconi and Mathieu Parenti ()
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Paola Conconi: University of Oxford, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, CESifo - CESifo, CEP - Center for Economic Performance

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Abstract: Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we construct a unique dataset that allows us to identify which firms lobby on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the United States, their position (in favour or against) and their lobbying effort on the ratification of each trade agreement. Using this dataset, we show that lobbying on FTAs is dominated by large multinational firms, which are in favour of these agreements. On the intensive margin, we exploit exogenous variation across FTAs to show that individual firms put more effort supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains – larger improvements in their access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competition – and that are more likely to be opposed by politicians. To rationalise these findings, we develop a new model of endogenous lobbying on trade agreements. In this model, heterogeneous firms select into trade and choose whether and how much to spend lobbying on the ratification of an FTA, and politicians may be biased in favour of or against the agreement.

Keywords: Trade agreements; Endogenous lobbying; Heterogeneous firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02
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Published in The Economic Journal, 2025, 135 (666), pp.487-518. ⟨10.1093/ej/ueae082⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying for Globalisation (2025)
Working Paper: Lobbying for Globalisation (2025)
Working Paper: Lobbying for Globalisation (2024)
Working Paper: Lobbying for Globalisation (2024)
Working Paper: Lobbying for Globalization (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04777527

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae082

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