Wage inequality in stakeholder organizations: Evidence from US labor unions 1959-2022

Thomas Breda and Paolo Santini ()
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Paolo Santini: Institute for Employment Research - University of Warwick [Coventry]

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Abstract: Although unions advocate higher wages and greater equality, little is known about their own compensation practices. Using newly assembled administrative data covering more than one million observations on U.S. union workers, we show that unions practice what they preach. They pay wages that are, on average, almost 20 percent higher than those in private firms, yet are substantially more equally distributed. We show that this pattern cannot be explained by differences in skill dispersion or firm size. Instead, we trace it to institutions and norms that limit top pay, including internal member control and media-driven reputational sanctions. Our findings underscore how pay norms can shape wages in stakeholder organizations and identify the institutional channels through which such norms become effective.

Keywords: Inequality; Trade Unions; Transparency; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
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Working Paper: Wage inequality in stakeholder organizations: Evidence from US labor unions 1959-2022 (2026)
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