Essays in contract theory and its applications

Essais en la théorie des contrats et ses applications

Juan Sebastian Ivars
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Juan Sebastian Ivars: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This dissertation comprises four independent essays and examines how to design institutional settings—such as contracts, laws, or organizational structures—to optimally address asymmetric information problems while pursuing socially or privately desirable goals. Each chapter aims to (modestly) improve our understanding of issues in public procurement, optimal incentive schemes, and organizational design. Chapter 1, co-authored with Isact Antonio Olave Cruz, measures the different forms of manipulation that public officials use when awarding public procurement contracts in Colombia, tests their implications for outcomes, and discusses potential welfare-improving legal designs. Chapter 2 seeks to better characterize the optimal incentive scheme that a competing organization offers to its workers and evaluates the effects of competition on incentive structures. Chapter 3, co-authored with Joaquín Coleff, analyzes organizational design (hierarchies) as an incentive device to motivate two non-contractible actions within an organization. Finally, Chapter 4 examines how firms use incomplete contracts to exploit informational advantages.

Keywords: Optimal incentives; Hierarchies; Public procurement; Moral hazard; Incitations; Marchés publics; Aléa moral (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05-20
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://theses.hal.science/tel-05466957v1
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Published in Economics and Finance. Institut d'études politiques de paris - Sciences Po, 2025. English. ⟨NNT : 2025IEPP0024⟩

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