Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error

Murat Mungan (), Marie Obidzinski and Yves Oytana ()
Additional contact information
Murat Mungan: George Mason University [Fairfax]
Yves Oytana: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study how legal procedures may evolve over time in response to technological advancements which increase the accuracy of evidence collection methods. First, we show that accuracy and type-1 errors (wrongful findings of liability) must reduce each other's effectiveness in mitigating optimal type-2 errors (wrongful failures to assign liability) for previous results in the literature to hold. When this condition holds, for major crimes the median voter's tolerance for type-1 errors is reduced as the legal system's accuracy increases. However, this relationship need not hold for minor offenses. Our analysis also reveals that legal processes that emerge under electoral pressures convict more often than is optimal but less often than necessary to maximize deterrence. Moreover, when the median voter's preferences are implemented, an increase in accuracy can counterintuitively reduce welfare.

Keywords: Crime; deterrence; legal errors; accuracy; standard of proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04229266v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04229266v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2023)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2023)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2023)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04229266

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().