Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules

Mostapha Diss and Boris Tsvelikhovskiy ()
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Boris Tsvelikhovskiy: Northeastern University [Boston]

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Abstract: Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The present paper is de- voted to study coalitional manipulability within the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any number of alternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing to characterize all the outcomes that can be manipulable by a coalition of voters. This gives us the possibility to find the probability of manipulable outcomes for some well-studied scoring voting rules in the case of small number of alternatives and large electorates under a well-known assumption on individual preference profiles.

Keywords: Voting; Scoring Rules; Coalition; Strategic Manipulation; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04543626v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2021)
Working Paper: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2021)
Working Paper: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2020)
Working Paper: Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (2020)
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