The rates matter! Assessing the credibility of international corporate tax rate harmonization via cooperative game theory

Guillaume Sekli and Alexandre Chirat ()
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Guillaume Sekli: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Alexandre Chirat: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: International taxation; Tax cooperation; Profit shifting; Tax havens; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04543809v1
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