Credit Claiming

Amihai Glazer and Björn Segendorff
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Björn Segendorff: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 458, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.

Keywords: Leader; Credit claiming; asymmetric information; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2001-08-14
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Related works:
Journal Article: Credit claiming (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0458

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