How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?

Tommy Andersson, Zaifu Yang and Dongmo Zhang ()
Additional contact information
Dongmo Zhang : Intelligent Systems Laboratory, University of Western Sydney, Postal: University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith South DC, NSW 2751, Australia

No 2014:24, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.

Keywords: Ascending auction; assignment market; price control; Pareto efficiency; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2014-06-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-reg and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published as Andersson, Tommy, Zaifu Yang and Dongmo Zhang, 'How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?' in Economics Letters, 2015, pages 97-99.

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http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp14_24.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls? (2015)
Working Paper: How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls? (2014)
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