Admission and Common Knowledge

Geir Asheim and Martin Dufwenberg

Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The implications of assuming that it is commonly known that players consider only admissible best responses are investigated. Within a states-of-the-world model where a state, for each player, determines a startegy set rather than a strategy the concept of fully permissible sets is defined

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_004

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