Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust

Martin Dufwenberg

No 1997:1, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A simple model of marriage and divorce predicts that no marriages occur. Yet, in real life, people marry all the time in seemingly similar situations. This discordance is explained using psychological game theory. An emotional guilt effect is explicitly modeled and multiple belief-dependent equilibria become possible: some marriages don’t happen, some are formed but end in divorce, some last a lifetime. For certain parameterizations a lifelong efficient marriage is guaranteed; one spouse’s approval to marry signals a trust so strong as to force the other spouse to hold beliefs which make divorce exceedingly emotionally unattractive. These results may have some bearing also on other partnerships than marriage.

Keywords: Marriage; time consistency; emotions; guilt; psychological game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1996-12-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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