EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Multiagent Task Allocation in Complementary Teams: A Hunter-and-Gatherer Approach

Mehdi Dadvar, Saeed Moazami, Harley R. Myler and Hassan Zargarzadeh

Complexity, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-15

Abstract:

Consider a dynamic task allocation problem, where tasks are unknowingly distributed over an environment. This paper considers each task comprising two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried out by a certain type of agent. We address this problem using a novel nature-inspired approach called “hunter and gatherer.” The proposed method employs two complementary teams of agents: one agile in detecting (hunters) and another skillful in completing (gatherers) the tasks. To minimize the collective cost of task accomplishments in a distributed manner, a game-theoretic solution is introduced to couple agents from complementary teams. We utilize market-based negotiation models to develop incentive-based decision-making algorithms relying on innovative notions of “certainty and uncertainty profit margins.” The simulation results demonstrate that employing two complementary teams of hunters and gatherers can effectually improve the number of tasks completed by agents compared to conventional methods, while the collective cost of accomplishments is minimized. In addition, the stability and efficacy of the proposed solutions are studied using Nash equilibrium analysis and statistical analysis, respectively. It is also numerically shown that the proposed solutions function fairly; that is, for each type of agent, the overall workload is distributed equally.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/8503/2020/1752571.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/8503/2020/1752571.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:1752571

DOI: 10.1155/2020/1752571

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Complexity from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hin:complx:1752571