Two-Player Location Game in a Closed-Loop Market with Quantity Competition

Xiaofeng Chen, Qiankun Song and Zhenjiang Zhao

Complexity, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-12

Abstract:

This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition. Based on the Cournot and Hotelling models, a circle model is established for a closed-loop market in which two players (firms) play a location game under quantity competition. Using a two-stage (location-then-quantity) pattern and backward induction method, the existence of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is proved for the location game in the circle model with a minimum distance transportation cost function. In addition, sales strategies are proposed for the two players for every local market on the circle when the players are in the equilibrium positions. Finally, an algorithm for simulating the competitive dynamics of the closed-loop market is designed, and two numerical simulations are provided to substantiate the effectiveness of the obtained results.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:4325454

DOI: 10.1155/2020/4325454

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