Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Zhigang Chen, Qianyue Meng, Huichuan Wang, Rongwei Xu, Yongxi Yi, Ying Zhang and Honglei Xu

Complexity, 2021, vol. 2021, 1-15

Abstract: This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational†behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:complx:5530971

DOI: 10.1155/2021/5530971

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