The Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments

Hans-Theo Normann and Brian Wallace

No 04/11, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of three termination rules for repeated- game experiments. We compare treatments with a known finite end, an unknown end and two variants with a random termination rule. The termination rules do not significantly e ect cooperation rates.

Keywords: Termination rule; end-game e ect; infinite horizon; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D21 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2004-07, Revised 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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