Redistributive Public Employment

William Easterly, Reza Baqir and Alberto Alesina

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Politicians may use “disguised†redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. First, we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis. Next, we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model, namely that in U.S. cities, politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device. We find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (167)

Published in Journal of Urban Economics

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Related works:
Journal Article: Redistributive Public Employment (2000)
Working Paper: Redistributive Public Employment (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553013

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