Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications

Pierpaolo Battigalli (pierpaolo.battigalli@unibocconi.it)

No 275, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information. I define a class of iterative solution procedures, featuring a notion of “forward induction”: the Receiver tries to explain the Sender’s message in a way which is consistent with the Sender’s strategic sophistication and certain given restrictions on beliefs. The approach is applied to some numerical examples and economic models. In a standard model with verifiable messages a full disclosure result is obtained. In a model of job market signaling the best separating equilibrium emerges as the unique rationalizable outcome only when the high and low types are sufficiently different. Otherwise, rationalizability only puts bounds on the education choices of different types.

Date: 2004
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Journal Article: RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (2006)
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