Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability
Matthias Krakel
Additional contact information
Matthias Krakel: Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 3, 185-199
Abstract:
We discuss two incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice¡Xtournaments and piece rates. The existing literature on the comparison of these two incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited liability. The results show that piece rates dominate tournaments if idiosyncratic risk is sufficiently high despite the partial insurance effect of tournament compensation.
Keywords: incentives; piece rates; rank-order tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J33 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.05-3/pdf/vol_5-3-1.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ijbe.fcu.edu.tw/assets/ijbe/past_issue/No.05-3/abstract/01.html (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijb:journl:v:5:y:2006:i:3:p:185-199
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Business and Economics is currently edited by Hsiang-Tsai Chiang (Editor-in-Chief), Chiung-Ju Huang (Editor-in-Chief), Feng-Jyh Lin (Associate Editor), Tzu-Ching Weng (Associate Editor), Hsin-Yi Huang (Managing Editor) and Szu-Hsien Ho (Managing Editor)
More articles in International Journal of Business and Economics from School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Szu-Hsien Ho ().