Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?

Steven Phillips and Timothy Lane

No 2000/168, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: The view that the IMF’s financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on this hypothesis. While some element of moral hazard is a logical consequence of the IMF’s financial support, such moral hazard is difficult to detect in market reactions to various IMF policy announcements and there is no evidence that such moral hazard has recently been on the rise.

Keywords: WP; IMF financing; financing package; IMF funds; IMF lending; IMF action; IMF response; IMF staff estimate; IMF; moral hazard; disbursement policy; liquidity position; IMF governor; fund financial support; IMF disbursement; Fund program; Yield curve; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Systemically important financial institutions; Asia and Pacific (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2000-10-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

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