Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants

Donato Masciandaro (), Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor

No 2008/147, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.

Keywords: WP; governance arrangement; monetary policy; governance rating; independence rating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2008-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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