The Perils of Bilateral Sovereign Debt

Francisco Roldan and Cesar Sosa Padilla

No 2025/235, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We study the interaction between private and official sovereign debts. We develop a quantitative sovereign default model featuring a senior creditor with whom borrowing terms are negotiated. We use this model to evaluate implications of the emergence of new official lenders not bound by the Paris Club framework. The dynamics of bilateral bargaining lead the government to issue more market debt, raising default risk and creating welfare losses. This relational overborrowing effect arises in the model due to an endogenous cross-elasticity of bilateral terms to market debt, which can be assessed in practice to evaluate new forms of bilateral sovereign debt.

Keywords: Sovereign debt; debt dilution; bilateral bargaining; official debt; market debt; IMF working papers; default probability; large lender; borrowing country; debt price; Loans; Securities markets; Public and publicly-guaranteed external debt; Debt default; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2025-11-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg and nep-opm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2025/235

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