Analysis of National Strategies to Counter a Country's Nuclear Weapons Program

David J. Caswell (), Ronald A. Howard () and M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell ()
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David J. Caswell: Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Ronald A. Howard: Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell: Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Decision Analysis, 2011, vol. 8, issue 1, 30-45

Abstract: Finding the best national strategy to prevent or delay a country from acquiring nuclear weapons continues to be a critical issue for U.S. policy makers. In this paper, we build on previous work to develop a model that addresses this question. This model identifies the strategy that minimizes the disutility of the overall cost of the strategy and the cost of the consequences resulting from the strategy. We illustrate the insights that the model provides with a case study of Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Keywords: nuclear counter proliferation; national security; national strategy; influence diagrams; adversary analysis; decision analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:8:y:2011:i:1:p:30-45

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