The Ombudsman: Is the Evidence Sufficient to Take Action on Executive Pay? Reply to Commentators

J. Armstrong and Philippe Jacquart ()

Interfaces, 2013, vol. 43, issue 6, 602-604

Abstract: The experimental evidence in this collection of papers is sufficient for organizations to take action—at least with respect to investigating or testing alternative pay schemes. Some organizations have already implemented a number of these procedures. The failure of an organization’s directors to follow evidence-based procedures for executive pay might be used as a basis for legal action by shareholders when results are detrimental to a firm.

Keywords: corporate governance; executive compensation; incentives; Mondragon; say on pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.2013.0710 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orinte:v:43:y:2013:i:6:p:602-604

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Interfaces from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().