Rejoinder: Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation

Olivier Rubel () and Ashutosh Prasad ()
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Olivier Rubel: Graduate School of Management, University of California Davis, Davis, California 95616
Ashutosh Prasad: School of Business, University of California Riverside, Riverside, California 92521

Marketing Science, 2024, vol. 43, issue 1, 232-233

Abstract: We discuss the sales compensation design problem in [Rubel O, Prasad A (2016) Dynamic incentives in sales force compensation. Marketing Sci. 35(4):676–689]; hereafter RP16, under the comments given by [Kong X, Cheng Q, Yu Y (2023) Commentary on “Dynamic incentives in sales force compensation”. Marketing Sci. 43(1):229–231]. Using the solution procedure of RP16, we show that the optimal compensation plan is concave, as in RP16, when the agent’s coefficient of risk aversion is high, but it remains to be fully solved when the agent’s coefficient of risk aversion is low. Some directions for the latter case are provided.

Keywords: agency theory; analytic models; sales force (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:43:y:2024:i:1:p:232-233

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