CEO Ability, Pay, and Firm Performance
Yuk Ying Chang (),
Sudipto Dasgupta () and
Gilles Hilary
Additional contact information
Yuk Ying Chang: School of Economics and Finance, College of Business, Massey University, Wellington 6021, New Zealand
Sudipto Dasgupta: Department of Finance, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Management Science, 2010, vol. 56, issue 10, 1633-1652
Abstract:
Do chief executive officers (CEOs) really matter? Do cross-sectional differences in firm performance and CEO pay reflect differences in CEO ability? Examining CEO departures over 1992-2002, we first find that the stock price reaction upon departure is negatively related to the firm's prior performance and to the CEO's prior pay. Second, the CEO's subsequent labor market success is greater if the firm's predeparture performance is better, the prior pay is higher, and the stock market's reaction is more negative. Finally, better prior performance, higher prior pay, and a more negative stock market reaction are associated with worse postdeparture firm performance. Collectively, these results reject the view that differences in firm performance stem entirely from non-CEO factors such as the firms' assets, other employees, or "luck," and that CEO pay is unrelated to the CEO's contribution to firm value.
Keywords: CEO ability; CEO pay; managerial labor market; firm performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (84)
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1205 (application/pdf)
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Working Paper: CEO Ability, Pay, and Firm Performance (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:56:y:2010:i:10:p:1633-1652
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