Customers as Friendly Shareholders: Uncovering the Complex Mutual Fund-Broker Relationship

Nitish Kumar (), Yuehua Tang () and Kelsey D. Wei ()
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Nitish Kumar: Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611
Yuehua Tang: Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611
Kelsey D. Wei: Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 4, 2568-2589

Abstract: This paper examines mutual funds’ dual role as both clients and shareholders of broker banks. Mutual funds are more likely to hold and significantly overweight stocks of their broker banks. In line with the portfolio decisions, fund voting is biased toward broker management in contentious proposals. Such voting bias is inconsistent with maximizing broker banks’ shareholder value yet significantly affects voting outcomes and the presence of contentious proposals at the banks’ shareholder meetings. Furthermore, we show that although client funds are rewarded with preferential initial public offering allocations from connected brokers for their voting support, fund managers’ engagement in reciprocal practices is ultimately determined by the economic tradeoffs they face. Our study not only uncovers a new mechanism—being brokers’ friendly shareholders—through which the two parties maintain their quid pro quo relationships but also raises a broader concern about governance of important financial institutions.

Keywords: mutual funds; brokerage firms; investment banks; proxy voting; IPO allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:4:p:2568-2589

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