Talent Poaching and Job Rotation
Diego Battiston (),
Miguel Espinosa () and
Shuo Liu ()
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Diego Battiston: School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9JT, United Kingdom
Miguel Espinosa: Department of Management and Technology, Bocconi University, 20136 Milan, Italy
Shuo Liu: Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
Management Science, 2025, vol. 71, issue 4, 2975-2992
Abstract:
The value of a firm’s service lies both in its workers and its relationship with clients. In this paper, we study the interaction between the client-specific experience accumulated by workers, poaching behaviour from clients, and strategic rotation of workers by firms. Using detailed personnel data from a security service firm, we show that an increase in client-specific experience increases both the productivity of workers and their probability of being poached. The firm reacts to this risk by rotating workers across multiple clients, and more frequently so for those workers more likely to be poached. Furthermore, we find that after a policy change that prohibited poaching, the firm sharply decreased the frequency of rotation, which in turn increased workers’ productivity. We propose a theoretical model that guides the empirical patterns and allows us to argue their external validity beyond our specific empirical setting. Finally, we provide survey evidence from the security service sector, demonstrating the consistency between our findings and industry observations.
Keywords: talent poaching; job rotation; outsourcing; strategic human capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:4:p:2975-2992
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