Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality

Marie A. McKendall and John A. Wagner
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Marie A. McKendall: Grand Valley State University, 236 Lake Huron Hall, Allendale, Michigan 49401
John A. Wagner: Michigan State University, Department of Management, East Lansing, Michigan 48824

Organization Science, 1997, vol. 8, issue 6, 624-647

Abstract: Research on corporate illegality spans several distinct literatures and defies ready integration. This article helps to overcome those problems. Analysis of data from 80 U.S. industrial organizations indicates that lower industry profitability is associated with higher frequencies of detected serious violations of federal environmental laws. Organizational profitability, industry concentration, organization size, structural complexity, organizational decentralization, and ethical climate join this variable in statistical interactions also associated with detected instances of serious environmental violations. However, none of those variables are found to be associated with the incidence of detected nonserious violations. These results provide qualified support for a model of corporate illegality in which illegal behaviors are attributable to the interactive effects of motive, opportunity, and choice. They suggest that illegal corporate activities resist simple explanation, and that future research on corporate illegality should concentrate on further development of multivariable models.

Keywords: corporate illegality; organizational dysfunction; environmental laws; TOBIT regression analysis; multivariable model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:8:y:1997:i:6:p:624-647

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