Extractive Taxation and the French Revolution

Tommaso Giommoni, Gabriel Loumeau and Marco Tabellini

No 26-02, IRENE Working Papers from IRENE Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: In this paper, we provide systematic evidence in support of the long-standing hypothesis that taxation was an important driver of the French Revolution. We first document that areas with heavier taxes experienced more riots between 1750 and 1789 and voiced more complaints against taxation in the cahiers de doléances of 1789. After showing that these effects are driven by indirect taxes, we exploit sharp spatial differences in the salt tax and the traites—the two principal indirect levies—to implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD). We find that unrest was higher on the high-tax side of the border. These effects intensified over time, peaking in the 1780s, and were stronger where fiscal disparities were larger and Enlightenment ideas more widespread. We further show that adverse weather shocks amplified unrest in high-tax municipalities. We then document that taxation fueled the spread of unrest during the Grande Peur—the wave of revolts that swept France in July 1789 and culminated in the abolition of feudal privileges. Finally, we link taxation to revolutionary politics in Paris, documenting that deputies from heavily taxed constituencies were more likely to frame the tax system as oppressive, support the Revolution, demand the abolition of the monarchy, and vote for the king's execution.

Keywords: Taxation; French Revolution; state capacity; regime change. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H20 H31 N43 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 163 pages.
Date: 2026-02
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