Centralized Admission and the Student-College Match

Cecilia Machado and Christiane Szerman ()
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Christiane Szerman: University College London

No 10251, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Decentralized assignments in the education market have been increasingly replaced by centralized ones. However, empirical evidence on these transitions are scarce. This paper examines the adoption of centralized admissions in the Brazilian higher education market. Using rich administrative data, we exploit time variation in the adoption of a clearinghouse across institutions to investigate its impact on student sorting, migration and enrollment. We find that institutions under the centralized assignment are able to attract students with substantially higher test scores and that geographical mobility of admitted students increases. While there are no sizable effects on final enrollment rates, search is intensified. Overall, our findings indicate positive impacts of centralization on the college market.

Keywords: test scores; college admission; centralized matching; higher education; migration; enrollment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10251

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