Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules

Alessandro Cigno, Alessandro Gioffré and Annalisa Luporini ()

No 12373, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: How does the distribution of individual preferences evolve as a result of marriage between individuals with different preferences? Could a family rule be self-enforcing given individual preferences, and remain such for several generations despite preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of attention to their elderly parents if the couple's preferences satisfy a certain condition, and the same condition is rationally expected to hold also where their children and respective spouses are concerned. Given uncertainty about who their children will marry, a couple's expectations will reflect the probability distribution of preferences in the next generation. We show that, in any given generation, some couples may obey the rule in question and some may not. It is also possible that a couple will obey the rule, but their descendants will not for a number of generations, and then obey it again. The policy implications are briefly discussed.

Keywords: matching; evolution; family rule; care of the elderly; migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D13 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2019-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Review of Economics of the Household, 2021, 19, 935-958

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolution of individual preferences and persistence of family rules (2021)
Working Paper: Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules (2020)
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