Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching

Ryo Kambayashi (), Kohei Kawaguchi () and Suguru Otani ()
Additional contact information
Kohei Kawaguchi: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
Suguru Otani: University of Tokyo

No 17613, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.

Keywords: market power of employers; monopsony; job matching intermediary; recruitment elasticity; inquiry; application; interview; offer; control function approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 J30 J42 J64 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp17613.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching (2024)
Working Paper: Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17613

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().