The Role of Interpersonal Uncertainty in Prosocial Behavior

Anujit Chakraborty () and Luca Henkel ()
Additional contact information
Anujit Chakraborty: University of California, Davis
Luca Henkel: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 17708, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In prosocial decisions, decision-makers face interpersonal uncertainty–uncertainty about how their choices impact others' utility. We use three approaches to show how it shapes classic patterns of prosocial behavior like ingroup favoritism, merit-based fairness, and self-favoring behavior. First, we compare standard allocation decisions with decisions where we remove social consequences but retain uncertainty, revealing strikingly similar patterns across both. Second, we exogenously vary interpersonal uncertainty to estimate the aversion to interpersonal uncertainty and quantify how it combines with preferences to determine prosocial decisions. Finally, we show that self-reported interpersonal uncertainty systematic ally predicts behavior across individuals, choice patterns, and behavioral interventions.

Keywords: prosocial behavior; decision-making under uncertainty; interpersonal uncertainty; ingroup favoritism; merit-based fairness; self-favoring behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp17708.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17708

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().