Are Elites Meritocratic and Efficiency-Seeking? Evidence from MBA Students

Marcel Preuss (), Germán Reyes, Jason Somerville () and Joy Wu ()
Additional contact information
Marcel Preuss: Cornell University
Jason Somerville: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Joy Wu: University of British Columbia

No 17788, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Elites disproportionately influence policymaking, yet little is known about their fairness and efficiency preferences–key determinants of support for redistributive policies. We investigate these preferences using an incentivized lab experiment with a group of future elites–Ivy League MBA students. We find that elites implement more unequal earnings distributions than the average American, are highly sensitive to both merit-based inequality and efficiency costs of redistribution, and are less likely to hold strict meritocratic views. These findings provide novel insights into how elites' redistributive preferences may shape high levels of inequality and limited redistributive policy in the United States.

Keywords: meritocracy; efficiency; elite control; fairness ideals; redistributive preferences; MBA students; inequality; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ltv
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Working Paper: Are Elites Meritocratic and Efficiency-Seeking? Evidence from MBA Students (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17788

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