The Political Consequences of Controversial Education Reform: Lessons from Wisconsin’s Act 10

Barbara Biasi () and Wayne Aaron Sandholtz ()
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Barbara Biasi: Yale School of Management
Wayne Aaron Sandholtz: Nova School of Business and Economics

No 17836, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Public service reforms often provoke political backlash. Can they also yield political benefits for the politicians who champion them? We study a Wisconsin law that weakened teachers' unions and liberalized pay, prompting mass protests. Exploiting its staggered implementation across school districts, we find that the reform cut union revenues, raised student test scores, and increased pay for some teachers. Exposure to the law increased the incumbent governor's vote share by about 20% of his margin of victory and reduced campaign contributions to his opponent. Gains were larger in districts with stronger unions ex ante and in those where more voters benefited from the reform. Our findings highlight how even politically risky reforms can generate electoral benefits under the right circumstances.

Keywords: Teacher Salaries; Collective Bargaining; Political Feasibility; Education Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 J31 J45 P11 P46 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-pol
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