The Value of Bonding at Work: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Michèle Belot () and
Rustamdjan Hakimov ()
Additional contact information
Michèle Belot: Cornell University
Rustamdjan Hakimov: University of Lausanne
No 17987, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
This study examines the effects of structured social activities on workplace collegiality and performance in a large white-collar firm with 100 geographically dispersed offices. In a randomized controlled trial, half of the offices received subsidies to organize biweekly social events over a three-month period—including picnics, movie nights, and team games. We find that the intervention strengthens collegiality, enhances workplace friendships, and improves office-level performance. We do not detect an impact on individual productivity, but turnover appears to have fallen in the short-run, meaning that employees stayed longer in the job. We explore possible mechanisms and identify a sense of gratitude and reciprocity toward the company as the most likely mechanism driving the effects.
Keywords: bonding; climate; workplace collegiality; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J32 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lma and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp17987.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17987
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().