Private Highs: Investigating University Overmatch Among Students from Elite Schools
Jo Blanden (),
Oliver Cassagneau-Francis (),
Lindsey Macmillan () and
Gill Wyness ()
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Jo Blanden: University of Surrey
Oliver Cassagneau-Francis: University College London
Lindsey Macmillan: University College London
Gill Wyness: University College London
No 18171, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
Inequality in college attendance is a key driver of intergenerational mobility. We focus upstream to examine how elite high-schools – specifically UK private (feepaying) schools – shape university destinations across the achievement distribution. Using linked-administrative data, we show the main advantage conferred by private schools is not access to elite colleges for their best students, but that lower-achieving students are more likely to ‘overmatch’: lower-achieving pupils from private schools enrol in university courses around 15 percentiles higher ranked than similarly qualified state-school students. Examining mechanisms, we show that this overmatch is driven largely by differences in application behaviour.
Keywords: private schools; higher education; educational economics; college choice; mismatch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I22 I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
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