Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania

Luca Uberti (), Drini Imami () and Mariapia Mendola ()
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Luca Uberti: University of Milano Bicocca
Drini Imami: Agricultural University of Tirana
Mariapia Mendola: University of Milan Bicocca

No 18510, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We study the impact of an election campaign on the labor market outcomes of incumbent party supporters. Using unique data on voters’ political preferences during a pre-election period in Albania and a DiD design that compares the evolution of outcomes among close neighbours, we show that supporting the ruling party significantly increases individuals’ employment and earnings. This labor market premium is particularly large among individuals with low costs of campaign participation, while atronage jobs are concentrated in lower-tier public sector positions. Administrative data further reveal that the allocation of jobs to party supporters is strongly associated with a higher vote share for the incumbent. These findings suggest that parties strategically allocate public employment to reward grassroots supporters and mobilize votes, a practice that fosters corruption and weakens democratic institutions.

Keywords: job patronage; political corruption; vote-buying; Albania; post-communist transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H83 J45 M59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18510

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