Collective Bargaining and the Wage Structure

Lorenzo Cappellari () and Bernardo Fanfani ()
Additional contact information
Lorenzo Cappellari: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Bernardo Fanfani: University of Turin

No 18797, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We study how updates in pay floors set by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) shape the wage structure in Italy. We estimate stacked event-panel difference-indifferences models around changes of contractual minima and trace distributional impacts. Pay-floor hikes of 2.2% on average raise mean log FTE daily wages by 2.2%, but effects are near zero at the 10th percentile and stronger at the 90th, implying inequalityenhancing wage-rate responses. This asymmetry reflects both within-agreement heterogeneity, as lower-paid workers within CBAs respond less, and between-agreement heterogeneity, as low-wage CBAs exhibit weaker pass-through. Non-compliance with pay floors is higher in low-wage CBAs, thus it is a potential driver of asymmetries even if its level is not affected by wage updates. Pay-floor hikes reduce employment and days worked only among low-wage workers and only among full-time jobs, which may further contribute to the muted wage response in the lower tail through selection mechanisms.

Keywords: collective bargaining; contractual minimum wages; wage structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J38 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp18797.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18797

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Fallak ().